British Expeditionary Warfare and the Defeat of Napoleon 1793 - 1815 [first edition]

Britain's naval victories in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars succeeded in protecting Britain from French invasion, but they could not of themselves defeat France. This required the support of allied armies and necessitated the shipping of large numbers of troops to, and successfully landing them on, French controlled territory - a major logistical operation. Wellington's expedition to Portugal and Spain led to Napoleon's defeat in the Peninsular War, but there were many other British expeditions before this which were not successful, in part because they were too logistically ambitious and/or they lacked allied support. This book examines the nature of combined operations and considers the planning and preparation of expeditions. It highlights the navy's important role in amphibious warfare and describes in detail the logistical operations which supported British expeditionary warfare in the period. It outlines the role of the Transport Board, explores how it periodically chartered a large proportion of the British merchant fleet and what the effects of this were on merchant shipping. The book concludes that the Transport Board grew in competence; that the failure of expeditions was invariably due to circumstances well beyond its control; and that its pivotal role in the preparation of all the major military expeditions in which hundreds of thousands of British troops served overseas was very significant and very effective.